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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially
white-box targeted attacks. One scheme of learning attacks is to design a proper
adversarial objective function that leads to the imperceptible perturbation for
any test image (e.g., the Carlini-Wagner (C&W) method Carlini and Wagner
[2016]). Most methods address targeted attacks in the Top-1 manner. In this
paper, we propose to learn ordered Top-k attacks (k ≥ 1) for image classification
tasks, that is to enforce the Top-k predicted labels of an adversarial example
to be the k (randomly) selected and ordered labels (the ground-truth label is
exclusive). To this end, we present an adversarial distillation framework: First,
we compute an adversarial probability distribution for any given ordered Top-k
targeted labels with respect to the ground-truth of a test image. Then, we learn
adversarial examples by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence together
with the perturbation energy penalty, similar in spirit to the network distillation
method Hinton et al. [2015]. We explore how to leverage label semantic similarities
in computing the targeted distributions, leading to knowledge-oriented attacks.
In experiments, we thoroughly test Top-1 and Top-5 attacks in the ImageNet-
1000 Russakovsky et al. [2015] validation dataset using two popular DNNs
trained with clean ImageNet-1000 train dataset, ResNet-50 He et al. [2016] and
DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]. For both models, our proposed adversarial
distillation approach outperforms the C&W method in the Top-1 setting, as well as
other baseline methods. Our approach shows significant improvement in the Top-5
setting against a strong modified C&W method.
1 Introduction
Visual recognition systems (e.g., image classification) play key roles in a wide range of applications
such as autonomous driving, robot autonomy, smart medical diagnosis and video surveillance.
Recently, remarkable progress has been made through big data and powerful GPUs driven deep
neural networks (DNNs) under supervised learning framework LeCun et al. [1998], Krizhevsky
et al. [2012]. DNNs significantly increase prediction accuracy in visual recognition tasks and even
outperform humans in some image classification tasks He et al. [2016], Szegedy et al. [2016]. Despite
the dramatic improvement, it has been shown that DNNs trained for visual recognition tasks can be
easily fooled by so-called adversarial attacks which utilize visually imperceptible, carefully-crafted
perturbations to cause networks to misclassify inputs in arbitrarily chosen ways in the close set of
labels used in training Nguyen et al. [2015], Szegedy et al. [2014], Athalye and Sutskever [2017],
Carlini and Wagner [2016], even with one-pixel attack Su et al. [2017]. Assuming full access to
DNNs pretrained with clean images, white-box targeted attacks are powerful ways of investigating
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Figure 1: Examples of ordered Top-5 attacks for a pretrained ResNet-50 model He et al. [2016] in the ImageNet-
1000 dataset. We compare a modified C&W method Carlini and Wagner [2016] (see details in Sec. 2.2.1) and
our proposed adversarial distillation method in terms of `2 distance between a clean image and the learned
adversarial example. Here, 9× 30 and 9× 1000 refer to the settings of hyperparameter search: we perform 9
binary searches for the trade-off parameter of perturbation energy penalty in the objective function and each
search step takes 30 and 1000 iterations of optimization respectively. Our method consistently outperforms the
modified C&W method. Similarly, our method obtains better results for the bottom image of Volleyball, where
the modified C&W9×30 method fails to attack. (Best viewed in color and magnification)
the brittleness of DNNs and their sensitivity to non-robust yet well-generalizing features in the data,
and of exploiting adversarial examples as useful features Ilyas et al. [2019].
In this paper, we focus on learning visually-imperceptible targeted attacks under the white-box setting.
One scheme of learning these attacks is to design a proper adversarial objective function that leads
to the imperceptible perturbation for any test image, e.g., the widely used Carlini-Wagner (C&W)
method Carlini and Wagner [2016]. However, most methods address targeted attacks in the Top-1
manner, which limits the flexibility of attacks, and may lead to less rich perturbations. We propose to
generalize this setting to account for ordered Top-k targeted attacks, that is to enforce the Top-k
predicted labels of an adversarial example to be the k (randomly) selected and ordered labels (k ≥ 1,
the ground-truth (GT) label is exclusive). Figure 1 shows two examples.
To see why Top-k targeted attacks are entailed, let’s take a close look at the “robustness" of an attack
method itself under the traditional Top-1 protocol. One crucial question is,
How far is the attack method able to push the underlying ground-truth label in the prediction of the
learned adversarial examples?
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Table 1: Results of showing where the ground-truth (GT) labels are in the prediction of learned adversarial
examples for different attack methods. The test is done in ImageNet-1000 validation dataset using a pretrained
ResNet-50 model He et al. [2016]. Please see Sec. 3 for details of experimental settings.
Method ASR Proportion of GT Labels in Top-k (smaller is better) Average Rank of GT
Labels (larger is better)Top-3 Top-5 Top-10 Top-50 Top-100
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 99.9 36.9 50.5 66.3 90.0 95.1 20.4
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 71.9 87.0 96.1 99.9 100 2.6
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 80.7 25.5 37.8 52.8 81.2 89.2 44.2
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 100 3.3 6.7 12 34.7 43.9 306.5
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 99.9 0.7 1.9 6.0 22.5 32.3 404.4
Consider a white-box targeted attack method such as the C&W method Carlini and Wagner [2016].
Although it can achieve 100% attack success rate (ASR) under the given Top-1 protocol, if the
ground-truth labels of adversarial examples still largely appear in the Top-5 of the prediction, we
may be over-confident about the 100% ASR, especially when some downstream modules may rely
on Top-5 predictions in their decision making. Table 1 shows the results. The C&W method does
not push the GT labels very far, especially when smaller perturbation energy is aimed using larger
search range (e.g., the average rank of the GT label is 2.6 for C&W9×1000). On the contrary, the three
untargeted attack approaches work much better in terms of pushing the GT labels, although their
perturbation energy are usually much larger. What is interesting to us is the difference of the objective
functions used by the C&W method and the three untargeted attack methods respectively. The former
maximizes the margin of the logits between the target and the runner-up (either GT or not), while
the latter maximizes the cross-entropy between the prediction probabilities (softmax of logits) and
the one-hot distribution of the ground-truth. Furthermore, the label smoothing methods Szegedy
et al. [2015], Pereyra et al. [2017] is often used to improve the performance of DNNs, which address
the over-confidence in the one-hot vector encoding of annotations. And, the network distillation
method Hinton et al. [2015], Bucila et al. [2006] views the knowledge of a DNN as the conditional
distribution it produces over outputs given an input. One question naturally arises,
Can we design a proper adversarial distribution similar in spirit to label smoothing to guide the
ordered Top-k attack by leveraging the view of point of network distillation?
Our proposed method aims to harness the best of the above strategies in designing proper target
distributions and objective functions to achieve both high ASR and low perturbation energy. Our
proposed ordered Top-k attacks explicitly push the GT labels to a “safe" zone of retaining the ASR.
Towards learning the generalized ordered Top-k attacks, we present an adversarial distillation
framework: First, we compute an adversarial probability distribution for any given ordered Top-
k targeted labels with respect to the ground-truth of a test image. Then, we learn adversarial
examples by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence together with the perturbation energy
penalty, similar in spirit to the network distillation method Hinton et al. [2015]. More specifically,
we explore how to leverage label semantic similarities in computing the targeted distributions,
leading to knowledge-oriented attacks. We measure label semantic similarities using the cosine
distance between some off-the-shelf word2vec embedding of labels such as the pretrained Glove
embedding Pennington et al. [2014]. Along this direction, a few questions of interest that naturally
arise are studied: Are all Top-k targets equally challenging for an attack approach? How can we
leverage the semantic knowledge between labels to guide an attack approach to learn better adversarial
examples and to find the weak spots of different attack approaches? We found that KL is a stronger
alternative than the C&W loss function, and label semantic knowledge is useful in designing effective
adversarial distributions.
In experiments, we develop a modified C&W approach for ordered Top-k attacks as a strong
baseline. We thoroughly test Top-1 and Top-5 attacks in the ImageNet-1000 Russakovsky et al.
[2015] validation dataset using two popular DNNs trained with clean ImageNet-1000 train
dataset, ResNet-50 He et al. [2016] and DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]. For both models, our
proposed adversarial distillation approach outperforms the vanilla C&W method in the Top-1 setting,
as well as other baseline methods such as the PGD method Madry et al. [2018], Kurakin et al. [2017].
Our approach shows significant improvement in the Top-5 setting against the modified C&W method.
We observe that Top-k targets that are distant from the GT label in terms of either label semantic
distance or prediction scores of clean images are actually more difficulty to attack.
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Our Contributions. This paper makes three main contributions to the field of learning adversarial
attacks: (i) To our knowledge, this is the first work of learning ordered Top-k attacks. This generalized
setting is a straightforward extension of the widely used Top-1 attack and able to improve the
robustness of adversarial attacks themselves. (ii) A conceptually simple yet effective framework,
adversarial distillation is proposed to learn ordered Top-k attacks under the white-box settings. It
outperforms a strong baseline, the C&W method Carlini and Wagner [2016] under both the traditional
Top-1 and the proposed ordered Top-5 in the ImageNet-1000 dataset using two popular DNNs,
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016] and DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]. (iii) Knowledge-oriented design
of adversarial target distributions are studied whose effectiveness is supported by the experimental
results.
Paper organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview
the white-box targeted attacks and the C&W method, and then present details of our proposed
adversarial distillation framework for the ordered Top-k targeted attack. In Section 3, we present
thorough comparisons in ImageNet-1000. In Section 4, we briefly review the related work. Finally,
we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Problem formulation
In this section, we first briefly introduce, to be self-contained, the white-box attack setting and the
widely used C&W method Carlini and Wagner [2016] under the Top-1 protocol. We then define the
ordered Top-k attack setting and develop a modified C&W method for it (k > 1) as a strong baseline.
Finally, we present our proposed adversarial distillation framework.
2.1 Background on white-box targeted attack under the Top-1 setting
We focus on classification tasks using DNNs. Denote by (x, y) a pair of a clean input x ∈ X and
its ground-truth label y ∈ Y . For example, in the ImageNet-1000 classification task, x represents a
RGB image defined in the lattice of 224× 224 and we have X , R3×224×224. y is the category label
and we have Y , {1, · · · , 1000}. Let f(·; Θ) be a DNN pretrained on clean training data where Θ
collects all estimated parameters and is fixed in learning adversarial examples. For notation simplicity,
we denote by f(·) a pretrained DNN. The prediction for an input x from f(·) is usually defined using
softmax function by,
P = f(x) = softmax(z(x)), (1)
where P ∈ R|Y| represents the estimated confidence/probability vector (Pc ≥ 0 and
∑
c Pc = 1) and
z(x) is the logit vector. The predicted label is then inferred by yˆ = arg maxc∈[1,|Y|] Pc.
In learning targeted attacks under the Top-1 protocol, for an input (x, y), given a target label t 6= y,
we seek to compute some visually-imperceptible perturbation δ(x, t, f) using the pretrained and fixed
DNN f(·) under the white-box setting. White-box attacks assume the complete knowledge of the
pretrained DNN f , including its parameter values, architecture, training method, etc. The perturbed
example x′ = x+ δ(x, t, f) is called an adversarial example of x if t = yˆ′ = arg maxc f(x′)c and
the perturbation δ(x, t, f) is sufficiently small according to some energy metric. We usually focus on
the subset of inputs (x, y)’s that are correctly classified by the model, i.e., y = yˆ = arg maxc f(x)c.
Learning δ(x, t, f) under the Top-1 protocol is posed as a constrained optimization problem Athalye
and Sutskever [2017], Carlini and Wagner [2016],
minimize E(δ) = ||δ||p, (2)
subject to t = arg max
c
f(x+ δ)c,
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
where E(·) is defined by a `p norm (e.g., the `2 norm) and n the size of the input domain (e.g., the
number of pixels). To overcome the difficulty (non-linear and non-convex constraints) of directly
solving Eqn. 2, the C&W method expresses it in a different form by designing some loss functions
L(x′) = L(x + δ) such that the first constraint t = arg maxc f(x′)c is satisfied if and only if
L(x′) ≤ 0. The best loss function proposed by the C&W method is defined by the hinge loss of
logits between the target label and the runner-up,
LCW (x
′) = max(0,max
c6=t
z(x′)c − z(x′)t). (3)
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Then, the learning problem becomes,
minimize ||δ||p + λ · L(x+ δ), (4)
subject to x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n,
which can be solved via back-propagation with the constraint satisfied via introducing a tanh layer.
For the trade-off parameter λ, a binary search will be performed during the learning (e.g., 9× 1000).
2.2 The proposed ordered Top-k attack setting
It is straightforward to extend Eqn. 2 for learning ordered Top-k attacks (k ≥ 1). Denote by
(t1, · · · , tk) the ordered Top-k targets (ti 6= y). We have,
minimize E(δ) = ||δ||p, (5)
subject to ti = arg max
c∈[1,|Y|],c/∈{t1,ti−1}
f(x+ δ)c, i ∈ {1, · · · , k},
x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n.
2.2.1 A modified C&W method
We can modify the loss function (Eqn. 3) of the C&W method accordingly to solve Eqn. 5. We have,
L
(k)
CW (x
′) =
k∑
i=1
max(0, max
j /∈{t1,··· ,ti}
z(x′)j − z(x′)ti). (6)
So, the vanilla C&W loss (Eqn. 3) is the special case of Eqn. 6 (i.e., when k = 1).
2.2.2 Our proposed knowledge-oriented adversarial distillation framework
In the C&W loss functions, only the margin of logits between the targeted labels and the runner-ups
is taken into account. In our adversarial distillation framework, we adopt the view of point proposed
in the network distillation method Hinton et al. [2015] that the full confidence/probability distribution
summarizes the knowledge of a trained DNN. We hypothesize that we can leverage the network
distillation framework to learn the ordered Top-k attacks by designing a proper adversarial probability
distribution across the entire set of labels that satisfies the specification of the given ordered Top-k
targets.
Consider the Top-k targets, (t1, · · · , tk), we want to define the adversarial probability distribution,
denoted by P adv in which P advti > P
adv
tj (∀i < j) and P advti > P advj (∀j /∈ (t1, · · · , tk)). The space
of candidate distributions are huge. We present a simple knowledge-oriented approach to define
the adversarial distribution. We first specify the logit distribution and then compute the probability
distribution using softmax. Denote by Z the maximum logit (e.g., Z = 10 in our experiments). We
define the adversarial logits for the ordered Top-k targets by,
zadvti = Z − (i− 1)× γ, i ∈ [1, · · · , k], (7)
where γ is an empirically chosen decreasing factor (e.g., γ = 0.3 in our experiments). For the
remaining categories j /∈ (t1, · · · , tk), we define the adversarial logits by,
zadvj = α×
1
k
k∑
i=1
s(ti, j) + , (8)
where 0 ≤ α < zadvtk is the maximum logit that can be assigned to any j, s(a, b) is the semantic
similarity between the label a and label b, and  is a small position for numerical consideration (e.g.,
 = 1e-5). We compute s(a, b) using the cosine distance between the Glove Pennington et al. [2014]
embedding vectors of category names and −1 ≤ s(a, b) ≤ 1. Here, when α = 0, we discard the
semantic knowledge and treat all the remaining categories equally. Note that our design of P adv is
similar in spirit to the label smoothing technique and its variants Szegedy et al. [2015], Pereyra et al.
[2017] except that we target attack labels and exploit label semantic knowledge. The design choice is
still preliminary, although we observe its effectiveness in experiments. We hope this can encourage
more sophisticated work to be explored.
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With the adversarial probability distribution P adv defined above as the target, we use the KL di-
vergence as the loss function in our adversarial distillation framework as done in network distilla-
tion Hinton et al. [2015] and we have,
L
(k)
adv(x
′) = KL(f(x′)||P adv), (9)
and then we follow the same optimization scheme as done in the C&W method (Eqn. 4).
3 Experiments
In this section, we present results of our proposed method tested in ImageNet-1000 Russakovsky
et al. [2015] using two pretrained DNNs, ResNet-50 He et al. [2016] and DenseNet-121 Huang et al.
[2017] from the PyTorch model zoo 2. We implement our method using the AdverTorch toolkit 3.
Our source code will be released.
Data. In ImageNet-1000 Russakovsky et al. [2015], there are 50, 000 images for validation. We
obtain the subset of images for which the predictions of both the ResNet-50 and DenseNet-121 are
correct. To reduce the computational demand, we further test our method in a randomly sampled
subset, as commonly done in the literature. To enlarge the coverage of categories, we first randomly
select 500 categories and then randomly chose 2 images per selected categories, resulting in 1000 test
images in total.
Settings. We follow the protocol used in the C&W method. We only test `2 norm as the energy
penalty for perturbations in learning. But we evaluate learned adversarial examples in terms of three
norms (`1, `2 and `∞). We test two search schema for the trade-off parameter λ in optimization: both
use 9 steps of binary search, and 30 and 1000 iterations of optimization are performed for each trial
of λ. Only α = 1 is used in Eqn. 8 in experiments for simplicity due to computational demand. We
compare the results under three scenarios proposed in the C&W method Carlini and Wagner [2016]:
The Best Case settings test the attack against all incorrect classes, and report the target class(es) that
was least difficult to attack. The Worst Case settings test the attack against all incorrect classes, and
report the target class(es) that was most difficult to attack. The Average Case settings select the target
class(es) uniformly at random among the labels that are not the GT.
FGSM PGD MIFGSM CW9x30 Ours9x30 CW9x1000 Ours9x1000
Failure Failure 17.51 0.80 0.71 0.58 0.48
Clean Image
Top-1 Attack:
Norfolk Terrier à
1) Volleyball
ℓ2 norm of perturbation:
Top-1 Attack:
Volleyball à
1) Norfolk Terrier 
Failure 14.35 17.75 0.77 0.63 0.61 0.53ℓ2 norm of perturbation:
Figure 2: Adversarial examples learned with the Top-1 attack setting using ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]. The
perturbation is shown by `2 distance between the clean image and adversarial examples. For better visualization,
we use different scales in showing the heat maps for different methods. (Best viewed in color and magnification)
2https://github.com/pytorch/vision/tree/master/torchvision/models
3https://github.com/BorealisAI/advertorch
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Table 2: Results and comparisons under the Top-1 targeted attack setting. We also test against three state-of-
the-art untargeted attack methods, FGSM and PGD and MIFGSM, and the last two use 10 steps in optimization.
Model Attack Method Best Case Average Case Worst Case
ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 2.3 9299 24.1 0.063 0.46 9299 24.1 0.063 0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 99.6 4691 14.1 0.063 88.1 4714 14.2 0.063 57.1 4748 14.3 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 5961 17.4 0.063 99.98 6082 17.6 0.063 99.9 6211 17.9 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 209.7 0.777 0.022 99.92 354.1 1.273 0.031 99.9 560.9 1.987 0.042
Ours9×30 100 140.9 0.542 0.018 99.9 184.6 0.696 0.025 99.9 238.6 0.880 0.032
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 95.6 0.408 0.017 100 127.2 0.516 0.023 100 164.1 0.635 0.030
Ours9×1000 100 81.3 0.380 0.016 100 109.6 0.472 0.023 100 143.9 0.579 0.029
DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 6.4 9263 24.0 0.063 1.44 9270 24.0 0.063 0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 100 4617 14.2 0.063 97.2 4716 14.2 0.063 87.6 4716 14.2 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 5979 17.6 0.063 100 6095 17.6 0.063 100 6218 17.9 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 99.9 188.6 0.694 0.019 99.9 279.4 1.008 0.028 99.9 396.5 1.404 0.037
Ours9×30 99.9 136.4 0.523 0.017 99.9 181.8 0.678 0.024 99.9 240.0 0.870 0.031
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 98.5 0.415 0.016 100 132.3 0.528 0.023 100 174.8 0.657 0.030
Ours9×1000 100 83.8 0.384 0.016 100 115.9 0.485 0.023 100 158.69 0.610 0.030
Table 3: Results of Top-1 targeted attacks using 5 most-like labels and 5 least-like labels as targets respectively,
based on the label semantic similarities.
Model Similarity Attack Method Best Case Average Case Worst Case
ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]
Most like
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 32.4 9137 23.8 0.063 0.0862 9137 23.8 0.063 0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 99.9 4687 14.1 0.063 94.6 4708 14.2 0.063 78.4 4737 14.3 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 5993 17.4 0.063 99.98 6110 17.7 0.063 99.9 6228 17.9 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 138 0.51 0.012 99.94 249 0.89 0.023 99.9 401 1.40 0.035
Ours9×30 100 114 0.43 0.011 99.96 171 0.62 0.020 99.9 251 0.87 0.028
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 82 0.34 0.010 100 126 0.48 0.018 100 194 0.68 0.026
Ours9×1000 100 75 0.32 0.010 100 117 0.46 0.018 100 187 0.65 0.025
Least like
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 0.4 8860 23.4 0.063 0.08 8860 23.4 0.063 0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 99.4 4696 14.1 0.063 84.82 4721 14.2 0.063 50 4762 14.3 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 5960 17.4 0.0625 99.96 6069 17.6 0.063 99.8 6194 17.9 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 99.9 259 0.95 0.025 99.9 421 1.51 0.035 99.9 639 2.25 0.046
Ours9×30 99.9 154 0.59 0.020 99.9 194 0.73 0.026 99.9 240 0.89 0.033
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 102 0.44 0.019 100 132 0.54 0.025 100 165 0.65 0.032
Ours9×1000 100 85 0.40 0.019 100 111 0.49 0.024 100 142 0.59 0.030
DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]
Most like
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 46.1 9132 23.8 0.063 14.62 9143 23.8 0.063 0.3 9263 24.0. 0.063
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 100 4692 14.1 0.063 98.92 4712 14.2 0.063 94.7 4733 14.3 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 6010 17.5 0.063 100 6128 17.7 0.063 100 6245 18.0 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 130 0.48 0.010 100 218 0.77 0.021 100 332 1.14 0.031
Ours9×30 100 114 0.42 0.010 100 170 0.61 0.019 100 250 0.85 0.028
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 85 0.34 0.010 100 134 0.50 0.018 100 210 0.71 0.026
Ours9×1000 100 77 0.33 0.010 100 124 0.48 0.018 100 202 0.69 0.026
Least like
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015] 2.1 9101 23.7 0.063 0.42 9101 23.7 0.063 0 N.A. N.A. N.A.
PGD10 Kurakin et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018] 100 4698 14.2 0.063 96.32 4718 14.2 0.063 83.6 4745 14.3 0.063
MIFGSM10 Dong et al. [2018] 100 5973 17.4 0.0625 99.98 6082 17.9 0.063 99.9 6203 17.9 0.063
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 99.9 215 0.79 0.023 99.9 310 1.12 0.030 99.9 428 1.52 0.039
Ours9×30 99.9 145 0.56 0.019 99.9 188 0.70 0.025 99.9 240 0.88 0.032
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 102 0.43 0.018 100 134 0.54 0.024 100 170 0.65 0.031
Ours9×1000 100 85 0.40 0.018 100 114 0.49 0.024 100 149 0.59 0.031
3.1 Results for the Top-1 attack setting
We first evaluate whether the proposed adversarial distillation framework is effective for the traditional
Top-1 attack setting. The results show that the proposed method can consistently outperform the
C&W method, as well as some other state-of-the-art untargeted attack methods including the PGD
method Madry et al. [2018], Kurakin et al. [2017].
Figure 2 shows two qualitative results. We can see the C&W method and our proposed method
“attend" to different regions in images to achieve the attacks. Table 2 shows the quantitative results.
Our proposed method obtains smaller `1 and `2 norm, while the `∞ norm are almost the same. Note
that we only use the `2 norm in the objective function in learning. We will evaluate the results of
explicitly using `1 and `∞ norm as penalty respectively in future work.
As shown in Table 3, we also test whether the label semantic knowledge can help identify the weak
spots of different attack methods, and whether the proposed method can gain more in those weak
spots. We observe that attacks are more challenging if the Top-1 target is selected from the least-like
set in terms of the label semantic similarity (see Eqn. 8).
3.2 Results for the ordered Top-5 attack setting
We test ordered Top-5 attacks and compare with the modified C&W method. Our proposed method
significantly outperforms the modified C&W method, especially for the 9× 30 optimization scheme,
as shown in Table 4. We also observe improvement on the `∞ norm for the ordered Top-5 attacks
(please see Figure 1 for two visual examples).
We also test the effectiveness of knowledge-oriented specifications of selecting the ordered Top-5
targets with similar observation obtained as in the Top-1 experiments (see Table 5).
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Table 4: Results and comparisons under the ordered Top-5 targeted attack protocol using randomly selected and
ordered 5 targets (GT exclusive).
Model Attack Method Best Case Average Case Worst Case
ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞ ASR `1 `2 `∞
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 75.8 2370 7.76 0.083 29.34 2425 7.94 0.086 0.7 2553 8.37 0.094
Ours9×30 96.1 1060 3.58 0.056 80.68 1568 5.13 0.070 49.8 2215 7.07 0.087
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 437 1.59 0.044 100 600 2.16 0.058 100 779 2.77 0.074
Ours9×1000 100 285 1.09 0.034 100 359 1.35 0.043 100 456 1.68 0.055
DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 96.6 2161 7.09 0.071 73.68 2329 7.65 0.080 35.6 2530 8.28 0.088
Ours9×30 97.7 6413 2.14 0.043 92.66 1063 3.57 0.057 83.3 1636 5.35 0.072
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 392 1.42 0.040 100 527 1.89 0.052 100 669 2.37 0.065
Ours9×1000 100 273 1.05 0.033 100 344 1.29 0.042 100 425 1.57 0.052
Table 5: Results of ordered Top-5 targeted attacks using 5 most-like labels and 5 least-like labels as targets
respectively, based on the label semantic similarities.
Model Similarity Attack Method ASR `1 `2 `∞
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]
Most like
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 80 1922 6.30 0.066
Ours9×30 96.5 1286 4.20 0.054
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 392 1.43 0.042
Ours9×1000 100 277 1.05 0.035
Least like
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 27.1 2418 7.90 0.085
Ours9×30 77.1 1635 5.35 0.072
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 596 2.15 0.060
Ours9×1000 100 370 1.39 0.045
DenseNet-121 Huang et al. [2017]
Most like
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 92.1 1798 5.88 0.059
Ours9×30 98.4 1228 4.00 0.050
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 361 1.31 0.039
Ours9×1000 100 265 1.00 0.034
Least like
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 75.7 2325 7.64 0.080
Ours9×30 92.8 1076 3.63 0.057
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 529 1.90 0.052
Ours9×1000 100 343 1.29 0.042
To further evaluate the proposed method, we also test the ordered Top-5 attacks using labels with 5
highest and 5 lowest clean prediction scores as targets respectively, as shown in Table 6. We observe
similar patterns that the 5 labels with the lowest clean prediction scores are more challenging to
attack. This shed lights on learning data-driven knowledge: Instead of using the label semantic
knowledge which may have some discrepancy in guiding the design of adversarial loss functions, we
can leverage the similarities measured based on the confusion matrix in the training data if available.
We leave this for future work.
4 Related work
The growing ubiquity of DNNs in advanced machine learning and AI systems dramatically increases
their capabilities, but also increases the potential for new vulnerabilities to attacks. This situation has
become critical as many powerful approaches have been developed where imperceptible perturbations
to DNN inputs could deceive a well-trained DNN, significantly altering its prediction. Please refer
to Akhtar and Mian [2018] for a comprehensive survey of attack methods in computer vision. We
review some related work that motivate our work and show the difference.
Distillation. The central idea of our proposed work is built on distillation. Network distillation Bucila
et al. [2006], Hinton et al. [2015] is a powerful training scheme proposed to train a new, usually
lightweight model (a.k.a., the student) to mimic another already trained model (a.k.a. the teacher). It
takes a functional viewpoint of the knowledge learned by the teacher as the conditional distribution it
Table 6: Results of ordered Top-5 targeted attacks using labels with 5 highest and 5 lowest prediction scores of
clean images as targets respectively.
Model Clean prediction Attack Method ASR `1 `2 `∞
ResNet-50 He et al. [2016]
Highest
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 93 1546 4.98 0.042
Ours9×30 99.9 1182 3.78 0.039
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 205 0.75 0.025
Ours9×1000 100 170 0.65 0.023
Lowest
C&W9×30 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 13.4 2231 7.30 0.082
Ours9×30 68.6 1791 5.86 0.077
C&W9×1000 Carlini and Wagner [2016] 100 621 2.25 0.064
Ours9×1000 100 392 1.47 0.047
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produces over outputs given an input. It teaches the student to keep up or emulate by adding some
regularization terms to the loss in order to encourage the two models to be similar directly based
on the distilled knowledge, replacing the training labels. Label smoothing Szegedy et al. [2015]
can be treated as a simple hand-crafted knowledge to help improve model performance. Distillation
has been exploited to develop defense models Papernot et al. [2016] to improve model robustness.
Our proposed adversarial distillation method utilizes the distillation idea in an opposite direction,
leveraging label semantic driven knowledge for learning ordered Top-k attacks and improving attack
robustness.
Adversarial Attack. For image classification tasks using DNNs, the discovery of the existence of
visually-imperceptible adversarial attacks Szegedy et al. [2014] was a big shock in developing DNNs.
White-box attacks provide a powerful way of evaluating model brittleness. In a plain and loose
explanation, DNNs are universal function approximator Hornik et al. [1989] and capable of even fitting
random labels Zhang et al. [2016] in large scale classification tasks as ImageNet-1000 Russakovsky
et al. [2015]. Thus, adversarial attacks are always learnable provided proper objective functions are
given, especially when DNNs are trained with fully differentible back-propagation. Many white-box
attack methods focus on norm-ball constrained objective functions Szegedy et al. [2014], Kurakin et al.
[2017], Carlini and Wagner [2016], Dong et al. [2018]. The C&W method investigates 7 different loss
functions. The best performing loss function found by the C&W method has been appliedin many
attack methods and achieved strong results Chen et al. [2017], Madry et al. [2018], Chen et al. [2018].
By introducing momentum in the MIFGSM method Dong et al. [2018] and the `p gradient projection
in the PGD method Madry et al. [2018], they usually achieve better performance in generating
adversarial examples. In the meanwhile, some other attack methods such as the StrAttack Xu et al.
[2018] also investigate different loss functions for better interpretability of attacks. Our proposed
method leverage label semantic knowledge in the loss function design for the first time.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposes to extend the traditional Top-1 targeted attack setting to the ordered Top-k setting
(k ≥ 1) under the white-box attack protocol. The ordered Top-k targeted attacks can improve the
robustness of attacks themselves. To our knowledge, it is the first work studying this ordered Top-k
attacks. To learn the ordered Top-k attacks, we present a conceptually simple yet effective adversarial
distillation framework motivated by network distillation. We also develop a modified C&W method
as the strong baseline for the ordered Top-k targeted attacks. In experiments, the proposed method is
tested in ImageNet-1000 using two popular DNNs, ResNet-50 and DenseNet-121, with consistently
better results obtained. We investigate the effectiveness of label semantic knowledge in designing the
adversarial distribution for distilling the ordered Top-k targeted attacks.
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